We investigate the feasibility of quantum seals. A quantum seal is a state provided by Alice to Bob along with information which Bob can use to make a measurement, "break the seal," and read the classical message stored inside. There are two success criteria for a seal: the probability Bob can successfully read the message without any further information from Alice must be high, and if Alice asks for the state back from Bob, the probability Alice can tell if Bob broke the seal without permission must be high. We build on the work of [Chau, PRA 2007], which gave optimal bounds on these criteria, showing that they are mutually exclusive for high probability. We weaken the assumptions of this previous work by providing Bob with only a classical description of a prescribed measurement, rather than classical descriptions of the possible seal states. We show that this weakening does not affect the bounds but does simplify the analysis. We also prove upper and lower bounds on an alternative operational metric for measuring the success criteria.
Introduction
With a quantum seal, a sender hopes to communicate classical information using a quantum state and also verify whether that information has been extracted. This functionality is called a "seal" in analogy with the impressions made in wax or clay that have been used to ensure the integrity of letters and packages for thousands of years [1] . Alice wishes to give Bob a message that is only to be opened and read by Bob at a later date when an agreed upon set of conditions has been met. For example, the conditions might be "Do not open the message until the third night of Hannukah," or "Only open the message if instructed to do so by Alice." To this end, Alice gives Bob a quantum state and a classical description of a quantum measurement. If Bob makes the measurement described by Alice, with high probability he will extract the classical value of the message. Bob should be able to make this measurement without further information from Alice. However, at any time before the agreed upon conditions have been met, Alice can request the state back, and she would like to detect with high probability whether Bob has cheated and read the message, thereby "breaking the seal" prematurely. A seal therefore has two success criteria: 1) the probability Bob can successfully read the message if he follows Alice's instructions must be high, and 2) the probability Alice can tell if Bob broke the seal without permission must be high.
Quantum seals were introduced by Bechmann-Pasquinucci [2] , giving rise to a vibrant discussion into their feasibility under different considerations [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . The upshot is that without limitations on Bob's possible measurements, if Alice wants Bob to be able to learn her complete classical message with high probability, then she will not be able to detect his breaking of the seal with high probability 1 . However, this does not necessarily mean that quantum seals are entirely useless; for example, to send a very long message Alice can design a quantum seal that gives her a very high probability to catch Bob cheating, while also giving Bob a low but still finite probability of extracting the correct message that is much higher than his vanishingly small chance of randomly guessing it [8] .
Quantum seals are related to other quantum cryptographic protocols with no-go results such as quantum bit commitment [12] [13] [14] and quantum one-time memories [15] . In bit commitment, Alice first provides a quantum state, which is her commitment to a bit, and then she might later be asked to reveal her bit. Note this is in contrast to quantum seal protocols, in that once Alice has provided the seal to Bob, she is never asked to provide further information. It has been shown that quantum bit commitment can be built from quantum seals, and so is a strictly weaker primitive [16] .
On the other hand, a straightforward argument shows that a one-time memory (OTM) can be used to create a nearly perfect seal. An OTM is a device that contains two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1} n . Once one message is read, the other is destroyed. To create a seal from an OTM, Alice would set s to be the message and t to be a random string. Bob could therefore learn s perfectly without further input from Alice. However, once he reads s, he destroys t. To test if Bob had read the message, Alice could ask for the OTM back, try to learn t, and if it was inaccessible or not the string she stored, she would know Bob had cheated. Bob could try to make a new OTM to give back to Alice as a fake, but he would not know what string to store as t, so his guess would be inaccurate with high probability. Since seals are weaker than OTMs, a no-go for quantum seals does not necessarily follow from the no-go for quantum OTMs. However, we note that under certain physically realistic assumptions (such as no entangling operations), quantum OTMs can exist [17] , which implies the existence of quantum seals under similar restricted scenarios.
In prior work, Chau [8] proved optimal bounds on the success criteria of quantum seals in the case that Bob has knowledge of the different quantum states that he might receive from Alice. In this work, we weaken Bob's advantage by not giving him a description of the seal states, and instead giving him only a classical description of a quantum measurement and instructions for how to associate the possible outcomes with classical messages. Alice promises Bob that if he uses the specified measurement on the seal state, he will obtain the correct message with some guaranteed probability. She does not provide Bob with any further information as to how to implement the quantum measurement; Bob's choice of implementation affects the probability that his measurement can be detected by Alice 2 . Since Bob does not have information about the underlying states, it is potentially harder for him to design a cheating strategy.
Even with this restriction on Bob's information, we show that Bob can still read the message with high probability without detection. In particular, when we consider the case that Alice never wants to falsely accuse Bob of cheating, which is the same metric used by Chau [8] , we achieve the same bounds. Thus it would seem that restricting Bob's information in this way does not have a significant effect, while our analysis is somewhat simplified relative to Chau's.
We additionally examine an alternative operational metric for Alice's success in detecting whether Bob has broken the seal: we look at Alice's probability of detecting Bob cheating if she makes the optimal measurement to distinguish between the broken and unbroken seal states. This measurement may sometimes cause her to falsely accuse Bob of breaking the seal when he hasn't, but gives her a higher probability of detecting Bob's measurement when he has broken the seal 3 . Under this metric we show that Alice's chances of detecting Bob, though improved, are still not good.
In order to obtain some of our results, we prove a variation on the Gentle Measurement Lemma [18, 19] , which may be of independent interest. The Gentle Measurement Lemma states that if a measurement outcome occurs with high probability, and if that outcome is measured, then the state after the measurement is difficult to distinguish from the original state. We extend the Gentle Measurement Lemma to show that the state after measurement is difficult to distinguish from the original state with high probability even if it the outcome of the measurement is not known.
Preliminaries

Notation and Quantum Measurement
We use H to denote a Hilbert space, and D(H) to denote the set of positive linear operators acting on H with trace one; D(H) is the set of density matrices on H. For N ∈ N, we let [N] = {1, . . . , N}. I A denotes the identity operator on H A , but we drop the subscript if clear from context. A quantum measurement is described by a positive operator value measure (POVM). A POVM is a set of operators {E i } i∈[N] acting on a Hilbert space H such that ∑ N i=1 E i = I and E i 0. Given a state ρ ∈ D(H), the probability of measuring outcome i is tr(E i ρ).
There are an infinite number of ways to implement a given POVM [20, 21] (see [22] for a nice description of methods to implement a POVM) and the implementation affects the state the system is left in after the measurement. Here, we think of the implementation as a two step process. In the first step, we apply what we call the standard implementation: if ρ is measured and outcome i is obtained, the system is transformed as ρ → √
In the second step, a completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map is applied to the resultant state, and this map can depend on the outcome i of the first step.
The trace distance between quantum states ρ, σ ∈ D(H) is
The trace distance has an important operational meaning: given a state promised to be either ρ or σ with equal probability, the maximum probability of correctly distinguishing which state one has is
The Gentle Measurement Lemma [18, 19] says that if a state has high overlap with a POVM operator, and that outcome is measured, then the post-measurement state will not differ considerably from the pre-measurement state. More precisely, given a POVM operator E i on H and a state ρ ∈ D(H), where tr(
Finally, let 
Set-Up
. She promises Bob that if he performs the POVM E on ρ m , he will get an outcome (i, j) such that i = m with probability at least p. This promise implies
After giving System B to Bob, Alice may ask for it to be returned to her at any point. Bob's goal in our scenario is to make a measurement on ρ m that allows him to determine m, but when he returns the system to Alice, she can not detect his measurement. Alice's goal is to design a state ρ m and a POVM E , with the properties described above, such that Bob can not learn m without significantly altering |ψ m , so that when Alice asks for System B to be returned, she can reliably determine whether Bob has cheated.
We use two metrics to judge Alice's success in detecting Bob's potential breaking of the seal. First, suppose Alice has no prior knowledge as to whether Bob has cheated, so her a priori belief is that she either has her original state or a broken state with equal probability. We call p dist her maximum success probability in distinguishing whether or not Bob made a measurement that allowed him to learn the message with probability at least p. Second, suppose Alice would like to detect if Bob made a measurement that allowed him to learn the message with probability at least p, but never wants to falsely accuse Bob of cheating if he didn't actually read the message. We call p NFP (NFP for "no false positives") her maximum success probability in this task. This metric was previously used by Chau to quantify Alice's ability to detect cheating, but without the "no false positives" interpretation [7, 8] . If Alice chooses her message state |ψ m from some distribution of states, we take p dist and p NFP to be her success probabilities averaged over her choice of state.
For the quantum seal to behave as desired, we would like to have a protocol in which p is large, and p dist or p NFP are large, so that Bob can read the message correctly with high probability, but also Alice can detect if he read it or not. However, we show that if p is large, Bob can implement a POVM on ρ m in such a way that p dist and p NFP will be small.
A Naive Approach that Fails
In this section, we present a straightforward strategy that seems promising 4 , yet ultimately fails.
Let M = 2, so Alice wants to encode a binary message. Suppose Alice creates a state on 3q qubits that she plans to send entirely to Bob; that is, she sets H A = 1, and H B = C 2 3q . She chooses σ, τ ∈ S 3q uniformly at random, where S n is the symmetric group of degree n. Then Alice gives one of the following states to Bob, depending on whether she wants the message to be "1" or "2":
where U σ (respectively U τ ) is a unitary that acts on a Hilbert space of 3q qubits, and permutes the qubit registers according to the permutation σ (resp. τ). Alice tells Bob to measure each qubit using the POVM {|0 0|, |1 1|} (i.e. the standard basis projective measurement), and if the number of 0 outcomes is at least 3q/2, he should decide m = 1, and otherwise, he should decide m = 2. If Bob uses the standard implementation of Alice's POVM, he will perform a projective measurement, and he will be able to read the message perfectly, since the the number of 0 outcomes will be at most q when m = 1, and at least 2q when m = 2.
After the standard implementation, Bob is left with a standard basis state, which will be nearly orthogonal to the original state. Thus if Alice asked for the state back, she would with high probability be able to detect Bob's measurement.
Bob could try to disguise his measurement by applying a CPTP map to alter his state after measurement. Let's assume, without loss of generality, that m = 1, and also that Bob knows that Alice originally sent a state of the form U σ |0 ⊗2q |+ ⊗q for some σ ∈ S 3q . (This extra information can only help Bob.) Bob can replace qubits in registers where he got outcome 1 with states |+ , to try to make his state closer to Alice's original state. However with extremely high probability in the limit of large q (using e.g. Hoeffding's inequality [24] ), he will measure 0's in about half of the registers that originally contained the state |+ . For large q, Bob has a vanishingly small probability of correctly guessing where these "false 0" registers are, and if he guesses incorrectly, it will make his overlap worse. Thus, there is very little Bob can do to recover from the measurement; the seal has been broken, and Alice will detect his measurement.
So why does this protocol fail? While Alice told Bob that he should measure in the standard basis, Bob can instead use Alice's instructions to make a different but related measurement. He measures using the standard implementation of the POVM {Π 1 , Π 2 } where Π 1 is the projector onto standard basis states whose strings have more than 3q/2 zeros, and Π 2 is the projector onto the remaining standard basis states. Bob has thereby combined all of the measurement operators that correspond to a given outcome into a single measurement operator. For any choice of σ, τ ∈ S 3q , Π 1 |ψ 1 = |ψ 1 and Π 2 |ψ 2 = |ψ 2 . Thus Bob can deterministically distinguish the value of the message without disturbing the state and breaking the seal, and Alice will be completely unaware of his measurement.
In the next section, we show that there is always a way for Bob to cheat in a manner similar to this, as long as Alice wants Bob to be able to read the message with high probability.
No-Go For Quantum Seals
We will show that a good strategy for Bob is to apply the standard implementation of the POVM {F i } i∈ [M] , for
where E i,j are the elements of Alice's recommended POVM. If outcome F i occurs, Bob decides the message is i. Averaged over Bob's outcome, the full state on H A ⊗ H B after measurement is (see Section 2.1)
Now if Alice asks for Bob to return his system, and he did not make a measurement, she will have the state |ψ m ψ m |. If he did make the measurement using the POVM in Eq. (5), the state will be that in Eq. (6) .
We first bound p dist . Alice's goal is to determine which state she possesses. We assume Alice knows that if Bob made a measurement, he measured using the standard implementation of the POVM in Eq. (5), as this information can only help her. Then using the properties of the trace distance (see Section 2.1) and Eq. (6), the probability that she correctly distinguishes whether Bob has read the message is:
where we've used the triangle inequality. By the Gentle Measurement Lemma (Eq. (1)) [18, 19] and Alice's promise (Eq. (3)), we have the first norm in the second line of Eq. (7) is bounded as
We can rewrite the sum of norms in Eq. (7) using the fact that
Combining Eqs. (3), (5) and (7) to (9), we have
which we plot in Fig. 1 . Next we bound p NFP . If Bob is honest, when he returns System B to Alice, she will have the state |ψ m . Therefore, Alice needs a two-outcome POVM, such that one outcome will never occur if Bob is honest. The POVM that achieves this is {I AB − |ψ m ψ m |, |ψ m ψ m |}, where the first outcome will only be observed if Bob is dishonest. Thus because the eigenvalues of F i are between 0 and 1. Plugging in and using Cauchy-Schwarz, we have
For values of tr(F m ρ m ) ≥ 1/M, this expression is decreasing in tr(F m ρ m ), so since tr(F m ρ m ) ≥ p, we have
Bounds on p NFP for several values of M are shown in Fig. 2 . This formula is identical to Chau's bound [8, Eq. 33] 5 . Thus unfortunately we find Alice can not boost her success of detecting Bob's breaking of the seal by withholding information about the seal states. By either metric (p dist or p NFP ), we see that there is a trade off. If Alice wants Bob to be able to read the message with probability close to 1, then she will not be able to detect with high probability whether he has broken the seal. 
Achievability
In order to lower bound the achievability of the upper bounds of Section 4, it is sufficient to analyze the case that Alice not only provides a classical description of a POVM (and information about how to associate outcomes with classical messages), but additionally gives Bob information about the quantum seal states. Since this additional information can only help Bob, it will allow us to put lower bounds on p dist and p NFP . This is precisely the scenario that Chau analyzed, and he showed that his bounds are achievable [8] . Since our p NFP is the same as his bounds, this implies that our p NFP bound is optimal (see Fig 2) . It is interesting to note that when M 1, for which Bob will have a negligibly small probability of randomly guessing the correct message, quantum seals still offer some rather nontrivial capabilities. For example, Alice can create a quantum seal where Bob has a 10% chance of correctly reading the entire message, but Alice can detect if Bob has cheated with 99% probability and no false positives.
We next investigate whether Alice can achieve the bounds of Section 4 for the metric p dist for the case of a single bit message (M = 2). We consider a specific strategy for Alice and determine the probability with which she can detect Bob's cheating. This allows us to put a lower bound on p dist , but the specific strategy we choose might not be optimal.
Consider the case that H A = 1, H B = C 2 , and M = 2,
for φ that Alice has chosen uniformly at random from [0, 2π] , and E = {E 1 , E 2 } where
Alice provides all of this information to Bob, as well as telling him the value of p (we assume p > 1/2). As discussed above, since we are putting a lower bound on p dist , it is acceptable for Alice to give Bob this extra information about the seal states, since that information can only help him. Alice's success probability p dist is always analyzed in the case that Bob makes a measurement that obtains the correct outcome with probability at least p. But note that the unique optimal POVM for distinguishing |ψ 1 and |ψ 2 is the POVM E 1 and E 2 from Eq. (17) [25] , and this measurement only succeeds with probability p. Thus Bob must use this POVM to achieve the desired success probability.
Bob wants to minimize p dist on average over Alice's choice of φ. Using the fact that the trace norm is equal to the Euclidean norm on the Bloch sphere [23] , and using the fact that the position with the smallest distance on average to any point on a circle is in the center of the circle, we have that Bob would ideally like to return ρ(p) if m = 1, and ρ(1 − p) if m = 2 (see Eq. (2)). Luckily for Bob, if he simply returns the the result of his standard implementation of E (either the state |0 or |1 ) to Alice, on average over his measurement outcomes, he will return precisely ρ(p) in the case that m = 1, and ρ(1 − p) when m = 2. Thus Bob's optimal strategy for minimizing p dist is to do a projective measure in the standard basis and return the outcome state if Alice requests it.
We can now bound p dist (assuming Alice knows Bob implements the optimal strategy, since there is no reason for Bob to use any other strategy):
This lower bound is shown in Fig. 1 . Note that it exceeds the tight bounds for p NFP for M = 2, meaning that, unsurprisingly, Alice can better detect cheating if she can tolerate occasionally falsely accusing Bob. We leave for future investigation whether it is possible to improve upon this lower bound for p dist , the lower bounds on p dist for longer messages, and the related question of whether the upper bound of Section 4 is achievable or not.
